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Abstract: There are cases in which, intuitively, an agent’s action is both morally right in one sense, and morally wrong in another sense. Such cases (along with other intuitions about blameless wrongdoing and action-guidance) support distinguishing between the objective moral ‘ought’ and the subjective moral ‘ought.’ This chapter argues against drawing this distinction, on the grounds that the prescriptions delivered by an adequate objective moral theory must be sensitive to the mental states of agents. Specifically, an adequate theory of the objective moral ‘ought’ must respect a strong ought-implies-can principle—morally ought implies agentially can—in order to prescribe actions to real-life agents. An agent’s mental states determine what is agentially possible for that agent; thus, what an agent objectively morally ought to do is in part determined by the agent’s mental states. This chapter describes the structure of a compelling non-ideal moral theory that is both objective and mental state-sensitive. This non-ideal theory illuminates the shortcomings of extant objectivist and subjectivist moral theories, and illustrates how we can dispense with the subjective moral ‘ought.’ 
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Introduction

What one objectively morally ought to do seems to be distinct from what one morally ought to do in light of one’s credences, beliefs, or evidence. Consider the following example:​[1]​
Jill is a physician who must administer one of three drugs to a patient. Jill knows that drug A would partially cure the patient. Jill knows that either drug B or drug C would cure the patient, and that the other of drugs B or C would kill the patient. Jill doesn’t know whether B is the cure and C the killer, or vice versa. As a matter of fact, B would cure the patient and C would kill the patient.
Such examples suggest a difference between what one objectively ought to do and what one subjectively ought to do. Intuitively, Jill objectively ought to administer drug B, because that’s the drug that will, in fact, cure the patient; but Jill subjectively ought to administer drug A, because administering drug A is the best way for Jill to respond to Jill’s credences, beliefs, and evidence.
In this paper, I argue against drawing a distinction between objective and subjective moral prescriptions. One’s objective moral prescriptions are sensitive to one’s credences (and other mental states); as a result, the subjective/objective distinction obfuscates the ways in which what one objectively morally ought to do is mental state-sensitive. Once we see the way in which an objective moral theory must be mental state-sensitive, we can see that there’s no remaining role for the subjective moral ‘ought’ to play.
The first half of this paper motivates a view about the relationship between ability constraints on moral prescriptions and non-ideal moral theory. In section 1, I argue that in order for a moral theory to issue deontic verdicts about our actions, that theory must include an ability constraint. We can express this ability constraint using an ought-implies-can principle, where the “can” in that principle is the agential can. In section 2, I show that this ability constraint, combined with some further assumptions, generates a non-ideal moral theory. This non-ideal moral theory entails that one acquires more demanding moral prescriptions as one’s “agential abilities” increase.
In the second half of the paper, I argue that this non-ideal theory allows us to dispense with the subjective moral ‘ought.’ In sections 3 and 4, I use this non-ideal theory to clarify the ways in which current “subjectivist” and “objectivist” ethical theories are unsatisfactory. And in section 5, I argue that once we have a compelling non-ideal moral theory on the table, there’s no remaining work to be done by the subjective moral ‘ought.’
1. Morally Ought Implies Agentially Can
1.1 Ought-Implies-Can and The Prescription of Action

One of the tasks of a normative ethical theory is to deliver deontic verdicts about our potential actions. A deontic verdict about an action is a proposition that expresses the deontic status of that action, where the deontic status of an action is determined by the action’s moral “to-be-done-ness.” Familiar deontic statuses include permitted, obligatory, and impermissible. In this paper, I focus on what we morally ought to do; when an ethical theory says that S ought to Φ, that theory is prescribing Φ-ing, and so is delivering a deontic verdict about Φ-ing.
When a normative ethical theory prescribes an action to a real-life agent, the action prescribed must be a potential action of that agent (not of some other, differently constituted agent). Let’s assume that someone is an agent when they have the capacity to respond to normative reasons. In order for someone to respond to reasons—in order for someone to exercise their agency—they must have a variety of mental states, including credences and desires.​[2]​ We can then define the character of one’s agency at a time as the way in which one is disposed to respond to reasons at that time, where those dispositions are partially determined by one’s mental states. To say that an action prescribed to an agent must be a potential action of that agent means that the action must be compatible with the character of the agent’s agency. If a moral theory prescribes an action to an agent that only someone with a very different character of agency could perform, then the moral theory prescribes an action that the agent can perform only by first undergoing an agency-undermining event.
For example, return to Jill. Assume that Jill is risk-averse when it comes to their patient’s care, and aims to practice evidence-based medicine. Although there’s no change in Jill’s evidential situation, Jill must administer some drug or other by this afternoon. What would it take for Jill to form an intention to administer drug B—the cure—by this afternoon? Given the current character of Jill’s agency, the only way for Jill to form such an intention is for Jill to undergo an event that undermines their agency. Perhaps Jill could spontaneously come to believe that B is the cure, or perhaps Jill could spontaneously cease to care about not exposing the patient to unnecessary risk. But either way, in order to form the intention to administer B by this afternoon, the character of Jill’s agency would have to change radically, and in a way that is unresponsive to reasons—Jill would have to undergo a shift in their mental states that Jill could not bring about through the exercise of their own agency. Thus, if a moral theory says that Jill morally ought to prescribe B by this afternoon, then the theory prescribes that Jill undergo an agency-undermining event.
The Jill example suggests that if one can perform some action only by first undergoing an event that shifts the character of one’s agency, then an adequate moral theory cannot prescribe that action; an adequate moral theory must respect agency. Intuitively, were a moral theory to prescribe that I perform such an action, the theory would not prescribe that action to me, the agent that I am; rather, the theory would prescribe the action to the agent I could become after undergoing an agency-undermining event. Thus, the theory would fail to apply to me, the agent that I am. Moreover, were a moral theory to prescribe such an action to me, that prescription would amount to a demand that the feature in virtue of which the theory applies to me (namely, my agency) be undermined; and surely that is a strange demand.​[3]​ Finally, were a theory to prescribe such an action, that prescription would be deliberatively irrelevant; after all, there is not much point in deliberating about performing an action that I cannot perform through the exercise of my own agential powers.
The claim that an adequate ethical theory must respect agency supports a strong ability constraint. We can express this ability constraint using an ought-implies-can principle:
Morally ought implies agentially can (OIAC): if S ought to Φ, then Φ-ing is agentially possible for S.
Roughly, Φ-ing is “agentially possible” for S when S can Φ through the full-fledged exercise of S’s agential powers (that is, without undergoing an agency-undermining event).​[4]​ ​[5]​
Agential possibility is distinct from other varieties of possibility. First, agential possibility is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and physical possibility; some logically, metaphysically, and physically possible actions (e.g., administering drug B) are not agentially possible, because the agent cannot perform them unless they first undergo an agency-undermining event. Moreover, it could turn out that some agentially possible actions are not physically possible. For example, if physical determinism is true, then I only ever have one physically possible action. And yet, there could be physically impossible worlds in which I continue to respond to reasons in ways that are consistent with the character of my agency. So, one can have multiple agentially possible actions even if physical determinism is true. The relationship between agential possibility and psychological possibility is less clear, and depends on our characterization of psychological possibility. However, even these two concepts appear to be distinct. For example, it’s plausible that there are compulsive actions that are compatible with my psychology (and thus are psychologically possible), and yet fail to be full-fledged expressions of my agency (and thus not agentially possible).​[6]​
Agential possibility is a variety of possibility for, as opposed to possibility that. To see the difference between possibility for and possibility that, consider a gold statue of Cleopatra. It is possible that the statue of Cleopatra become a statue of Zenobia, because there’s a possible world in which the statue is melted down and made into a statue of Zenobia. But it is not possible for the statue of Cleopatra to become a statue of Zenobia, because were it to become a statue of Zenobia it would no longer be a statue of Cleopatra. Possibility that is determined by which possible worlds are accessible to the actual world (in the relevant sense of accessibility); possibility for a thing is determined by the identity conditions of that thing (the conditions under which that thing remains the same thing through change). I want to suggest that it is not agentially possible for Jill to administer the cure by this afternoon, because to do so Jill would have to undergo an agency-undermining event. Administering the cure by this afternoon is incompatible with the identity conditions for Jill qua agent, where those identity conditions depend on the character of Jill’s agency.
I’m making several assumptions about what is “within one’s power” as an agent. First, I assume that sometimes it is agentially possible for one to Φ and to not Φ. This assumption allows the concept of agential possibility to be compatible with actual agents’ experiences of choosing between two or more options. Second, I assume some paradigm cases in which an action is within an agent’s power, and in which an action is not within an agent’s power. For example, it is not within Jill’s power—absent being presented with compelling reasons in the meantime—to administer the cure to their patient; doing so would, for Jill, require an agency-undermining event. However, it is within Jill’s power to administer drug A, the partial cure—that’s an action Jill can perform while remaining the agent that Jill is, because administering the partial cure is continuous with the way in which Jill is disposed to respond to reasons.
Thus, the thought that a normative ethical theory should prescribe actions to me—that is, actions that are consistent with my particular identity qua agent—supports a strong ought-imples-can principle: morally ought implies agentially can (OIAC), where one is “agentially able” to Φ when it’s possible for one to Φ without undergoing an agency-undermining event.
1.2 Agential Possibility, Discontinuity, and Agency-Undermining Events

OIAC is underspecified. A fully specified version of the principle would provide an account of the exact conditions under which one can Φ while remaining the same agent. I suspect that there are multiple compelling accounts of the conditions under which an agent remains the same agent through change (and thus there are also a variety of compelling accounts of the conditions under which someone counts as undergoing an agency-undermining event). However, I also suspect that no matter which compelling account of agential identity we pair with OIAC, OIAC entails some interesting results.
To see some of these results, let’s continue to work with the minimal account of agency sketched in 1.1. Given that account of agency, abrupt and radical shifts in credences and desires—shifts that are not the results of responding to reasons—undermine one’s agency.​[7]​ One does not necessarily cease to be an agent when such a shift occurs; instead, such shifts undermine one’s agency in the sense that they cause the character of one’s agency to suffer from discontinuity, and thus one is plausibly no longer the same agent after the shift.​[8]​
For example, imagine that I undergo a conversion: in a way that is unresponsive to reasons, I develop a new set of credences and desires and then decide to take up a life like Diogenes’s. After that shift, I’m still an agent, because I can still respond to normative reasons. But the way in which I respond to reasons—the character of my agency—has changed radically. This sudden and radical shift in my credences and desires (shifts that are not themselves responses to reasons) undermine my agency by making the character of my agency discontinuous; these non-reason-responsive changes in the character of my agency are so sudden and extreme that the character of my agency doesn’t survive them. OIAC rules out prescriptions to perform actions that one could only perform by first undergoing such an agency-undermining event.
To summarize so far: I want to work with the concept of agential possibility. Agential possibility is a somewhat intuitive but under-theorized concept that is relevant to moral theorizing. However, it’s imprecise because of unclarity about the exact conditions under which one remains the same agent through change. Nevertheless, we can understand how OIAC operates by pairing it with a plausible view about agential identity, according to which an agent remains the same agent when the character of their agency remains continuous; the character of one’s agency remains continuous when the way in which one responds to normative reasons isn’t altered by an agency-undermining event.​[9]​ ​[10]​ ​[11]​
2. A Sketch of a Non-Ideal Moral Theory

OIAC provides the foundation for a non-ideal moral theory, that is, a normative ethical theory whose deontic verdicts are sensitive to the imperfections of agents. But to describe this non-ideal theory, it’s helpful to have one further assumption in place.
2.1 The Ranking Assumption

In order to see how OIAC generates a non-ideal moral theory, assume that an adequate moral theory also provides an axiological ranking of each agent’s metaphysically possible actions. Such a ranking allows the theory to prescribe “second-best” actions to agents who aren’t agentially able to do better.​[12]​
There are different ways in which a moral theory can rank and deliver deontic verdicts about actions. One option is for a moral theory to rank an agent’s metaphysically possible actions on the basis of some relation that those actions bear to moral values, and then issue deontic verdicts about those actions on the basis of that ranking. It’s natural to work with the promotion relation, which yields a theory with a teleological structure.​[13]​ However, we need not assume that the relevant relation is “promotion”—all we need is a relation that’s capable of producing a ranking of actions.
For simplicity’s sake, I assume that an adequate moral theory has a teleological structure. However, the reader can supply their own assumption about the structure of the correct moral theory, as long as that structure enables the theory to rank actions (and to issue deontic verdicts about actions on the basis of that ranking).
2.2 OIAC Objectivism

When we combine the ranking assumption with OIAC, we get a non-ideal theory: a moral theory that ranks an agent’s metaphysically possible actions, and then prescribes the agentially possible action that’s highest in that ranking. To see how this works, assume that our moral theory ranks all of my metaphysically possible actions according to the extent to which those actions promote moral values. OIAC then disqualifies agentially impossible actions from being prescribed to me. What I ought to do, then, is perform the highest-ranking agentially possible action.​[14]​ I will refer to this non-ideal theory as OIAC Objectivism because, as I describe at the end of the following sub-section, OIAC Objectivism is best understood as an objectivist account of the moral ‘ought.’
We shouldn’t say that one is morally obligated to perform the highest remaining action in the ranking. Although a moral theory can’t prescribe that an agent undergo an agency-undermining event, surely it is sometimes permissible (and valuable!) to undergo such events. For example, imagine that I have a terrible temper, and my temper prevents me from being agentially able to be kind to my family. Then, one day, I have an epiphany—in a way that’s unresponsive to reasons, my beliefs and motivations radically shift, and I no longer have a terrible temper. Presumably I do not violate an obligation by undergoing an agency-undermining event that enables me to be kind to my family. Thus, we shouldn’t say that the highest ranking agentially possible action is obligatory. Instead, we should say that the highest remaining action is prescribed to me, or that I ought to perform that action.
2.3 Four Key Features

We can clarify OIAC Objectivism by focusing on four of its distinctive features: (i) the ways in which it is demanding; (ii) the ways in which it is not demanding; (iii) the ways in which credences (and other mental states) affect moral prescriptions, according to OIAC Objectivism; and (iv) the ways in which credences (and other mental states) do not affect moral prescriptions, according to OIAC Objectivism.
(i) One common worry about ability-constrained moral theories is that such theories “let one off the hook” too easily. For example, we don’t want a moral theory to demand nothing of someone who is simply lazy.​[15]​
But OIAC Objectivism can be quite demanding. First, notice that OIAC Objectivism is consistent with moral prescriptions to “act out of character.” One’s character is determined by one’s long-standing dispositions and habits. Character is distinct from character of agency, where the character of one’s agency at a time is determined by the way in which one is disposed to respond to reasons at that time. Character is a long-term diachronic property, whereas character of agency is a synchronic property. So, one can “act out of character” while still retaining the character of one’s agency. For example, imagine a person for whom maiming another human would be out of character. Still, that person could find themselves in an extreme self-defense situation in which responding to reasons (in a way that’s continuous with how they’re disposed to respond to reasons) requires that they maim another human. In this type of case, maiming another human would be out of character for the person, but would not involve the character of their agency suffering from discontinuity. Thus, OIAC Objectivism is compatible with moral prescriptions to act out of character.
Another respect in which OIAC Objectivism is demanding: it can prescribe extremely demanding actions, as long as those actions take place after a sufficiently long amount of time (whatever amount of time is necessary for one to undergo the needed changes to the character of one’s agency, without undergoing an agency-undermining event). So, the demands of OIAC Objectivism are time-sensitive: there are cases in which the theory prescribes that I Φ next year, even though it doesn’t prescribe that I Φ tomorrow. For example, it’s sometimes agentially possible for someone to forgive their nemesis next year, even if it isn’t agentially possible for them to forgive their nemesis tomorrow. This is because, over time, one is able to change the character of one’s agency through the exercise of one’s agency. For instance, in order to make it agentially possible for oneself to forgive one’s nemesis, one might be agentially able to go to counseling.​[16]​ Thus, OIAC Objectivism will often prescribe that one do the best one agentially can to improve oneself in the short term, in order to enable oneself to perform even more valuable actions later. We can express this feature of OIAC Objectivism by refining OIAC:
Refined morally ought implies agentially can: If S morally ought at t1 to Φ at t2, then either:
	t1 = t2, in which case S agentially can Φ at t2, or
	t1 is earlier than t2, in which case S agentially can perform some action (or series of actions) at t1 that would in turn make it agentially possible for S to Φ at t2.​[17]​
(ii) The ways in which OIAC Objectivism is not demanding depend on the conditions under which one counts as remaining the same agent. As I’ve already acknowledged, we do not have a precise account of the conditions under which one counts as remaining the same agent. But here is one obvious way in which OIAC Objectivism is not demanding: it never demands that one undergo an agency-undermining event.
This feature distinguishes my non-ideal theory from other non-ideal theories, such as Holly Lawford-Smith’s. On Lawford-Smith’s view, moral prescriptions are constrained by a different ought-implies-can principle: if one ought to Φ, then if one tries to Φ one will probably succeed in bringing about a good “non-ideally accessible” state of affairs. A state of affairs S is non-ideally accessible at a time for an agent just in case the objective epistemic probability of S conditional on the agent performing the action of theirs that’s most likely to bring about S is greater than some contextually defined threshold (where the threshold is set by how much is morally at stake).​[18]​ Lawford-Smith argues that some states of affairs are not non-ideally accessible to me, and thus actions that could produce those states of affairs are not in my option set, and so aren’t obligatory for me. However, I can be obligated to perform actions that merely have some probability of a producing a non-ideally accessible state of affairs. One’s evidence, one’s personality traits, and one’s pathologies can affect the probability of an action producing a state of affairs, and thus can constrain which actions are within an agent’s option set.​[19]​
OIAC Objectivism is distinct from Lawford-Smith’s non-ideal theory because of the way in which OIAC Objectivism is sensitive to an agent’s beliefs and credences. Lawford-Smith holds that when one believes that some action is impossible and that action is necessary for some state of affairs, then that state of affairs counts as non-ideally inaccessible.​[20]​ For example, she says that if a child is drowning and I believe that it is impossible for me to save them, then I am not obligated to save them. But Lawford-Smith doesn’t think that one’s moral prescriptions are sensitive to other sorts of beliefs (or to the absence of certain types of beliefs). For example, she holds that if a child is drowning and I am entirely unaware of it, I can still be non-ideally morally obligated to save the child.​[21]​
According to OIAC Objectivism, additional types of beliefs (and credences) constrain which actions count as “available” to an agent. For example, I hold that when a child is drowning but one is completely unaware of it, it’s not the case that one ought to save the child. Whether one ought to save the child depends on which actions are agentially possible, and on which of those actions best promotes whatever is of moral value (keeping in mind that an agentially possible action might make other actions agentially possible later). For example, if the agent is babysitting a toddler in a house that has a swimming pool, then plausibly they are agentially able and ought to check on the toddler, which will provide them with evidence that the child is drowning; that evidence will in turn make saving the child agentially possible (and thus allow them to acquire a moral prescription to save the child). But if someone is home alone—with no children, and no swimming pool—and, completely unbeknownst to them, a child in a nearby house is drowning, it’s not the case that they ought to save the child. Given their epistemic state, saving a child from drowning isn’t something they can do—right now—while remaining the agent that they are; given their psychological and evidential state, they would need to undergo an agency-undermining event in order to form an intention to save the child. Thus, OIAC Objectivism is less demanding than Lawford-Smith’s non-ideal theory, because Lawford-Smith’s theory is compatible with violations of OIAC.​[22]​ ​[23]​
(iii) According to OIAC Objectivism, an agent’s credences—and other mental states—affect that agent’s moral prescriptions in two different ways. First, they place constraints on which actions are agentially possible for the agent. This is because one’s credences and other mental states affect the ways in which one is disposed to respond to reasons.
Second, credences and other mental states might—depending on our axiological commitments—determine which actions promote more moral value than other actions, and thus could affect the theory’s ranking of actions. For example, imagine two physicians who administer the same dose of morphine to their patients; one physician administers the morphine with an intention to kill their patient, while the other physician administers the morphine with an intention to relieve their patient’s pain. If, according to our axiological theory, performing one complex action (with a certain type of intention) promotes more moral value than a distinct complex action (which is almost physically identical but involves a different intention), then agents’ credences and mental states affect which action counts as the action that best promotes moral value.
(iv) Thus, OIAC Objectivism is credence- and mental state-sensitive; however, it is not credence- (or mental state-) dependent. We can clarify this distinction by relying on Shafer-Landau’s conception of stance-independence, which Shafer-Landau takes to be the calling-card of a realist moral theory. On Shafer-Landau’s view, a moral theory is stance-independent when it isn’t made true by its “ratification” from within an actual or hypothetical perspective.​[24]​
A stance-independent moral theory can at the same time be credence- (and mental state-) sensitive; even if a moral theory delivers deontic verdicts about actions partly on the basis of facts about agents’ mental states, no one’s mental states need affect the way in which the theory delivers deontic verdicts on the basis of such facts. For example, consider a toy moral theory according to which one ought not lie. Whether or not one counts as lying is sensitive to one’s credences; expressing a falsehood that one sincerely believes to be true is not, on most accounts, an instance of lying. Thus, this toy theory is mental state-sensitive. And yet, this toy theory can clearly remain stance-independent; even if whether or not I count as Φ-ing is sensitive to my mental states, the fact that Φ-ing is forbidden by the theory need not depend on anybody’s mental states.
OIAC Objectivism works similarly.​[25]​ Because OIAC Objectivism includes a strong ability constraint, its prescriptions are sensitive to agents’ mental states. But the way in which it issues deontic verdicts about actions on the basis of mental states need not be determined by anybody’s mental states. OIAC Objectivism might entail that I ought to Φ, and might do so partly on the basis of some of my mental states (namely, those mental states that enable me to Φ without having to undergo an agency-undermining event); but the fact that the theory delivers that prescription on the basis of those mental states need not be “up to” anyone.
I remain neutral on whether OIAC Objectivism is stance-independent. But the fact that it’s consistent with stance-independence shows that it can meet a high bar for counting as an objective, realist moral theory. Moreover, according to OIAC Objectivism, even extremely demanding prescriptions delivered to highly ideal agents (agents who are agentially able to perform highly value-promoting actions) are sensitive to the mental states of those agents; these “more ideal” prescriptions are in no sense more objective than “less ideal” prescriptions. Thus, OIAC Objectivism is best understood as an objectivist moral theory, albeit a mental state-sensitive one.
3. OIAC Violations

In the remainder of this paper, I show that OIAC Objectivism (a) can help us diagnose why extant “objectivist” and “subjectivist” views are unsatisfying, and (b) undermines the motivations for introducing a subjective moral ‘ought.’
3.1 Objectivism

One problem with extant objectivist views—according to which one’s genuine moral prescriptions are “objective,” and not “subjective”—is that they’re committed to violations of OIAC. On my view, such theories are inadequate because they do not reliably respect agency.
Peter Graham offers a particularly careful objectivist theory according to which it’s not the case that one has one’s moral obligations solely in virtue of facts about one’s evidential situation (where one’s evidential situation at a time is all of the evidence one has about the world at that time).​[26]​ Graham’s view makes room for the possibility that some epistemic facts play a role in determining one’s objective moral obligations. However, Graham maintains that one’s uncertainty never affects one’s moral obligations.​[27]​ On Graham’s view, Jill really ought to prescribe drug B, even though doing so would require that Jill undergo an agency-undermining event.
3.2 Externalist-Subjectivism

Subjectivists distinguish between objective and subjective moral prescriptions, and think that one’s genuine moral prescriptions are subjective. Some subjectivists—those I call “externalist” subjectivists—hold that one’s subjective moral prescriptions are sensitive to one’s non-moral credences, but not to one’s moral credences. Others—those I call “internalist” subjectivists—hold that one’s subjective moral prescriptions are determined by both one’s moral and non-moral credences.​[28]​ As I’ll explain in the next section, the problem with internalist-subjectivism is that it’s too permissive. But the problem with externalist-subjectivism is that it, too, entails violations of OIAC, because of its insensitivity to an agent’s moral credences.
For example, Holly Smith endorses a version of externalist-subjectivism. Smith thinks that we need both an objective and a subjective notion of moral obligation in order to understand the moral obligations of agents who experience non-moral uncertainty.​[29]​ ​[30]​ On Smith’s view, a principle of objective rightness tells one what one should do in light of all the non-moral facts, and thus applies to agents who have access to all morally salient non-moral information. But the objective principle must be supplemented by a hierarchy of subjective principles—“decision guides”—that can be used by agents who experience varying levels of uncertainty about morally relevant non-moral information. When one has more information, one can use a principle of subjective rightness that’s “higher” in the hierarchy, but low-information agents must use subjective principles that are “lower” in the hierarchy. Thus, what one subjectively ought to do is determined by which principle of objective rightness is correct, and how much non-moral information one has. Given the structure of Smith’s view, it is impossible for a principle of subjective rightness (or wrongness) to issue prescriptions for action that are sensitive to an agent’s moral credences.​[31]​
To see why externalist subjectivism violates OIAC, consider the following example. I care about non-human animals, and I’m pretty sure that the welfare of non-human animals matters a great deal, morally speaking. But I’m not sure, and thus I experience moral uncertainty. Unbeknownst to me, non-human animals have no moral status whatsoever, and their welfare is of no moral value. What really matters, according to the true axiological theory, is human happiness. Tonight, my picky foodie friends are coming over for dinner, and I must decide what to cook. The dinner that would best promote their happiness would be a meal of veal; these picky foodies would turn up their noses at a homely vegetable curry. According to externalist-subjectivism, what I ought to do is serve my guests the veal—that’s the meal that would best promote human happiness. But what would it take for me to prepare that meal this evening? Given my sincere concern for non-human animal welfare, and given a plausible specification of the ways in which I’m disposed to respond to reasons, we can easily imagine that I can’t form a reason-responsive intention to prepare the veal. Perhaps I could be struck by lightning and then—what luck!—come to accept the true axiological theory, which might then enable me to develop a reason-responsive intention to make the veal. But such a spontaneous reconfiguration of my credences and desires would be an agency-undermining event. Thus, externalist subjectivism sometimes violates OIAC.
4. Excessive Permissiveness

According to internalist-subjectivism, one’s subjective moral prescriptions are determined by one’s moral and non-moral credences. And according to a closely related view—“prospectivism”—one’s moral prescriptions are determined by one’s justified credences (both moral and non-moral). However, because both views say that one’s moral prescriptions are determined entirely by (some set of) one’s credences, both are too permissive.
One version of internalist-subjectivism is the view that one ought to act so as to maximize expected moral value. On this view, when one is uncertain between mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive moral propositions (such as non-human animals have no moral status and non-human animals have some moral status), one must determine the moral value of one’s prospective actions (e.g., cooking the veal and cooking the vegetable curry) conditional on each of those propositions, and then weight those values according to one’s credence levels in the propositions. One should then perform whichever action has the highest weighted average moral value.​[32]​
This type of view, as it’s usually presented, it isn’t a view about moral prescriptions. Some proponents of maximizing expected moral value say that one rationally ought to maximize expected moral value;​[33]​ others hold that one ought to maximize expected moral value in a metanormative sense of ‘ought.’​[34]​ But let’s consider a version of this view according to which one morally ought to maximize expected moral value. The problem with such a view is that it is unacceptably permissive. Consider a case in which Evan is certain of ethical egoism. When Evan is given the opportunity to secretly kill a neighbor and take their belongings, internalist-subjectivism says that Evan should commit the crime—given Evan’s credences, killing the neighbor and taking their belongings maximizes expected moral value. Given that internalist-subjectivism is excessively permissive in cases of moral certainty, it will also deliver the wrong results in cases of moral uncertainty.
Michael Zimmerman’s “prospectivist” view is susceptible to a similar objection. According to Zimmerman, one’s moral obligations are sensitive to one’s justified credences, where one’s justified credences are the credences one has that are rational, given the evidence one has availed oneself of.​[35]​ But assuming that one can have rational credences in morally horrifying propositions,​[36]​ Zimmerman must say that people sometimes morally ought to do horrifying things. 
One might worry that OIAC Objectivism is also susceptible to this objection, because there are possible highly imperfect agents who are only agentially able to perform horrifying actions. I admit that, in extreme cases involving agents with highly morally compromised psychologies, OIAC Objectivism sometimes entails that those agents ought to perform actions that are terrible. However, this result shouldn’t lead us to reject OIAC Objectivism. First, we have reason to doubt that most actual agents have such psychologies. Most actual agents have messy psychological profiles, which include a variety of credences and desires that enable the agent to respond to a variety of normative reasons; this messiness usually makes a range of actions agentially possible, and usually some actions within that range are not intuitively terrible. And second, OIAC Objectivism is much less permissive than other OIAC-respecting moral theories; this is because OIAC Objectivism does not simply direct an agent to “act on” some subset of their credences. It is sometimes agentially possible for us to act against our beliefs and credences; so, OIAC Objectivism has the resources to direct us to act against our credences when doing so will best promote moral value.​[37]​
5. Dispensing with the Subjective Moral ‘Ought’

I’ve shown that extant objectivist and subjectivist theories fall prey to two objections: they either violate OIAC, or are excessively permissive. “But,” one might object, “theories of the subjective moral ‘ought’ are well-motivated; they are motivated by a set of phenomena—intuitive dual moral evaluations, blame, and action-guidance—that call out for explanation.” In this last section, I argue that OIAC Objectivism can account for our intuitions about those phenomena.
5.1 Dual moral evaluations

One of the primary motivations for introducing a distinction between the objective and subjective moral ‘ought’ is that it vindicates the intuition that, in some cases, an agent acts both rightly and wrongly. For example, the physician who administers harmful medicine on the basis of excellent evidence seems to act objectively wrongly (because they harm their patient) and to act subjectively rightly (because they act well in light of their credences and evidence).​[38]​
However, OIAC Objectivism can make sense of these dual moral evaluations, and can do so without raising difficult questions about which sense of “morally ought” really applies to the agent. Let’s return again to Jill, who administers a suboptimal medicine as a result of carefully attending to the available evidence. We think that there’s a sense in which Jill acts wrongly, and OIAC Objectivism can explain that intuition: we recognize that it would be better for Jill to administer a different medicine. We recognize that a more ideal agent—one with access to better evidence—would be subject to a more ideal moral prescription, namely, a prescription to administer the cure. On my view, our “wrongness” intuition about Jill is grounded in an axiological fact about Jill and Jill’s circumstances. But, according to OIAC Objectivism, we’re mistaken to think that these evaluative facts entail that Jill’s action is wrong; it isn’t wrong, because (as I argued earlier) no better action is agentially possible for Jill. OIAC Objectivism can also explain our intuition that Jill acts rightly: we think that there’s a sense in which Jill acts rightly because Jill in fact satisfies the moral prescription that applies to them. Thus, we think that Jill acts rightly because Jill satisfies their actual moral prescription; and we think that Jill acts wrongly because we recognize that it would be better if Jill were subject to a more ideal moral prescription.
5.2 Blame

The subjective/objective distinction is sometimes used to account for intuitive verdicts about blameworthiness; specifically, the distinction seems to provide a helpful diagnosis of cases in which one is blameless for moral wrongdoing. Think again of Jill. In such cases, we’re tempted to say that Jill does the wrong thing (by administering a suboptimal drug) but is blameless. The subjective/objective distinction seems to account for this intuitive datum: Jill violates an objective prescription to administer drug B, and thus acts wrongly; at the same time, Jill satisfies a subjective prescription to do the best they can in light of their evidence, and thus acts blamelessly.
There is disagreement about whether one’s satisfaction of subjective prescriptions determines one’s blameworthiness.​[39]​ It isn’t obvious that the subjective moral ‘ought’ provides an adequate account of blameless wrongdoing; so, it isn’t too worrisome if OIAC Objectivism also fails to provide such an account.
Still, OIAC Objectivism has the resources to explain these intuitions about blameless wrongdoing. In order to account for our intuitions about blameless wrongdoing, OIAC Objectivism can say that blameworthiness coincides with failures to act as one ought. This entails that Jill isn’t blameworthy for administering the suboptimal drug, because Jill ought to administer the suboptimal drug. At the same time, OIAC Objectivism says that our intuition that administering the suboptimal drug is wrong is in fact tracking an axiological intuition; we mistakenly identify administering the partial cure as wrong because we recognize that it would be better (higher up in the ranking of actions) for Jill to administer the full cure. Thus, according to OIAC Objectivism, there is no blameless wrongdoing; but we sometimes believe in blameless wrongdoing because our axiological intuitions (intuitions about which actions are better than others) sometimes mistakenly generate deontic intuitions (intuitions about which actions one ought to perform).
5.3 Action-guidance

Philosophers often introduce a subjective sense of the moral ‘ought’ in order to account for the intuition that morality should be action-guiding. Holly Smith has developed one of the most careful positions on what this idea amounts to, and so I’ll focus on her view here.​[40]​
Smith holds that a moral theory’s principles must be usable in what she calls the “core” sense.​[41]​ Roughly, a principle is usable in the core sense when an agent could derive a prescription for action from the principle if the agent wanted to (which requires that the agent has beliefs about the morally salient non-moral features of their situation).​[42]​ A principle can also be usable in what Smith calls the “extended” sense; a principle is usable in the extended sense when the agent can derive a prescription for action from it and can also thereby conform to the principle. However, Smith holds that moral principles need only be usable in the core sense, because usability in the core sense is all that’s required for a moral principle to “secure an agent’s autonomy.”​[43]​
On Smith’s view, someone who holds false beliefs about their situation is still able to directly use—in the core sense—an objective moral principle.​[44]​ However, in these cases of non-moral error, the agent will misapply the principle. If a principle P prescribes actions that have feature F, someone who mistakenly believes that their action will have F can still derive a prescription for action from the principle—they just won’t be able to successfully conform to the principle. Thus, objectively correct moral principles count as “usable” (in the core sense) even by agents with mistaken beliefs about their circumstances. Usability problems arise, however, in cases of partial and absent credences. If one doesn’t have any credences concerning the non-moral features of one’s situation, or if one has only partial credences concerning the non-moral features of one’s situation, then the objective moral principles are not usable by the agent. This is why Smith’s view includes a hierarchy of principles of subjective rightness. Her principles of subjective rightness form a set of decision-guides—relative to a principle of objective rightness—for agents with partial or absent non-moral credences. The less information one has about one’s situation, the lower in the hierarchy of subjective principles one must go in order to find a usable subjective principle. Thus, Smith introduces a subjective notion of moral obligation in order to ensure that there exist moral principles that are usable (in the core sense) even by agents with partial or absent credences.
However, Smith’s account of usability (in the core sense) entails violations of OIAC, and thus threatens her claim that her theory is adequately action-guiding. Let P be an objectively true moral principle according to which One ought to promote animal welfare. And now imagine an agent who mistakenly believes that some action of theirs, Φ, will promote animal welfare. Given P and all of the morally relevant non-moral facts, the agent should not Φ, and should instead perform a different action, Ψ. So, P prescribes Ψ, although the agent has no idea that this is the case. (We can even assume that the agent has no good reason to believe that P prescribes Ψ.) Smith holds that P still applies to the agent, because P is usable by the agent in the core sense (because the agent can use P to derive a prescription for action if they want to). But because the agent can’t derive the correct prescription for action from P (at least, not without undergoing an agency-undermining event), we have yet another case in which a moral theory requires an agentially impossible action. Thus, the core sense of usability is unsatisfactory; a moral principle that’s usable in the core sense can still require that an agent undergo an agency-undermining event. As I’ve argued, such a principle fails to prescribe an action to the agent. And presumably, if a moral theory fails to reliably prescribe actions to agents, then it also fails to reliably guide action.
My own view is that a moral theory need not contain principles that are usable in either the “core” or “extended” senses. A moral theory is sufficiently action-guiding when it prescribes actions that moral agents can perform while retaining the character of their agency; the deliberative path to performing such actions does not necessarily involve the “use” or “consultation” of moral principles at all.
Conclusion

We should accept OIAC—morally ought implies agentially can—because it’s a precondition for the prescription of action to a particular agent. OIAC (combined with what I’ve called the “ranking assumption”) generates a compelling non-ideal moral theory, which I’ve called OIAC Objectivism. I’ve shown that OIAC Objectivism is interesting in two respects: (1) it allows us to diagnose why extant objectivist and subjectivist views in ethics are unsatisfying, and (2) it allows us to account for the intuitions that typically motivate the introduction of a supplemental theory of the subjective moral ‘ought.’ I’ve only provided a sketch of OIAC Objectivism. In order to get clearer on its content, we need to combine it with a more detailed axiological theory, and we need a more detailed account of the identity conditions for an agent. Still, this outline of OIAC Objectivism demonstrates that a non-ideal moral theory can allow us to dispense with the subjective moral ‘ought.’
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^1	 	This is a version of an example from Regan 1980 (pp. 264-5) and Jackson 1991 (pp. 462-3). 
^2	 	For elaboration on this claim, see Hicks (forthcoming).
^3	 	This observation is similar to Portmore’s claim that “it seems nonsensical to think that the very capacity in virtue of which I’m obligated to Φ is the one that, if exercised flawlessly, leads me not to Φ.” See Portmore 2019, p. 178. 
^4	 	Notice that if an action’s agential possibility were unrelated to the agent’s dispositions to respond to reasons, then there would be “agentially possible” actions that could only be performed by first undergoing agency-undermining events. Thus, “agentially possible” actions would (implausibly) include actions that require failures of agency.
^5	 	List seems to work with an “agential” conception of possibility when he discusses indeterminism at the “agential level” in Chapter 4 of List 2019. Nefsky also seems to make use of such a concept in Nefsky 2017, pp. 2760-2.
^6	 	Note that the thesis of this paper is compatible with introducing additional ability constraints on moral prescriptions.
^7	 	One might wonder: why not treat every non-reason-responsive shift in the character of one’s agency (including small shifts) as “agency-undermining”? My worry is that many of our credences and desires undergo some “arational drift,” and thus a view according to which every non-reason-responsive shift is agency-undermining would entail that our agency is regularly undermined.
^8	 	One might count as the same person after the shift; that depends on our theory of personal identity, and on whether our theory of personal identity comes apart from our theory of “agential” identity.
^9	 	OIAC is similar to some ought-implies-can principles proposed for the “deliberative” or “practical” ought. See Lord 2015 and Schwan 2018. However, I motivate OIAC differently; specifically, I treat it as a precondition for the prescription of full-fledged action.
^10	 	Wiens 2016 defends the view that the “normative oughts” proferred by institutional principles can be constrained by motivational deficiencies; I agree with Wiens, but am making the more contentious claim that moral prescriptions are similarly constrained (and I hold this view for different reasons).
^11	 	OIAC is in some ways similar to a “volitional” version of ought-implies-can that has been attributed to Kant. See Kohl 2015. However, the view I develop in this paper is not a Kantian view.
^12	 	Whether a non-ideal theory that employs OIAC must satisfy the ranking assumption is unclear to me. Perhaps there are deontological theories that respect OIAC, and yet do not provide rankings of agents’ actions on the basis of the relations those actions bear to moral values.
^13	 	See Dietrich and List 2017 for an account of when an ethical theory counts as teleological.
^14	 	This proposal is similar to the view developed in Portmore 2013, namely, that we ought to perform our best option. But my view is not the same as Portmore’s, because Portmore’s view concerns rational/prudential obligations. My view is also distinct from the version of consequentialism developed in Portmore 2011, because I’m assuming neither moral rationalism nor the teleological conception of reasons.
^15	 	See Estlund 2011 for a version of this worry.
^16	 	Of course, going to counseling is not always agentially possible; this is just one example of an agentially possible action that makes better actions agentially possible later.
^17	 	 Notice that this refined formulation commits me to a synchronic version of OIAC. For an overview of the debate about whether ought-implies-can principles should be synchronic or diachronic, see King 2019.
^18	 	Lawford-Smith 2013, pp. 655-658.
^19	 	Lawford-Smith 2013, pp. 658-663.
^20	 	Lawford-Smith 2013, p. 662.
^21	 	 Lawford-Smith 2013, p. 662.
^22	 	At the same time, OIAC Objectivism is arguably also more demanding than Lawford-Smith’s non-ideal theory. According to OIAC Objectivism, it could turn out that one sometimes ought to perform an action that one believes to be impossible; this can happen in cases in which an agent’s dispositions to respond to reasons allow them to attempt actions they believe to be impossible. 
^23	 	One might worry that the non-ideal theory I’ve proposed is too lenient because it seems to give the wrong verdict about what an agent with imperfect evidence ought to do. Specifically, one might worry that my view is susceptible to the same “problem of advice” that subjectivism faces. (See Graham 2010 for a description of this problem.) But I do not think that the phenomenon of advice threatens my view. I’m committed—like the subjectivist—to saying that requests for moral advice are not always literal requests for information about one’s moral prescriptions before the time of the request. Instead, requests for advice are often attempts to become more ideal (better epistemically positioned) agents, and so amount to attempts to become subject to new moral prescriptions.
^24	 	 Shafer-Landau 2003, p. 15.
^25	 	Although it’s not exactly similar. According to the toy theory, one’s mental states affect one’s prescriptions by determining the types that one’s actions fall under. On my view, one’s mental states affect one’s prescriptions by placing constraints on what one agentially can do. But in each case, the theory is mental state-sensitive and not mental state-dependent.
^26	 	Graham 2010, pp. 88-89.
^27	 	For example, see Graham 2010, pp. 97-8.
^28	 	Some views relativize prescriptions to one’s available evidence (see Robertson 2011). However, plausibly one is sometimes agentially unable to form or act on a belief licensed by one’s available evidence. For example, I might be unable to form or act on the belief My best friend is a murderer, even though my immediately available evidence warrants that belief. Thus, these evidence-relative versions of subjectivism will also suffer from the problem of OIAC violations.
^29	 	Smith 2010; Smith 2018.
^30	 	Harman 2015, Jackson 1991, and Prichard 1932 also endorse versions of externalist subjectivism.
^31	 	See Smith 2018, p. 17, 44.
^32	 	Versions of this view are defended by Tarsney 2018, MacAskill 2014, Sepielli 2009, and Lockhart 2000.
^33	 	Tarsney 2018; Sepielli 2009.
^34	 	MacAskill 2014.
^35	 	Zimmerman 2014.
^36	 	See Rosen 2015 for an explanation of why Zimmerman’s view leaves open the possibility of rational credences in horrifying moral propositions.
^37	 	For an elaboration on these two points, see Hicks (forthcoming).
^38	 	Smith 2010, pp. 64-5. See also Olsen 2017, pp. 352-4.
^39	 	For example, see Smith 2018, p. 289, 355.
^40	 	Feldman 2012 develops a related view, on which a normative ethical theory must include both an objective principle and an implementable subjective principle.
^41	 	In Smith 2010, she expresses this idea by saying that a moral principle must be usable as an “internal” decision guide. Smith 2010, p. 74.
^42	 	Smith 2018, p. 16.
^43	 	See Smith 2018, pp. 194-5.
^44	 	Smith 2018, pp. 38-9.
